Safety recommendations are the primary outcome of any technical investigation into serious incidents or accidents. They bridge the gap between determining the circumstances of the event and implementing measures to prevent recurrence. The table below presents safety recommendations formulated at the end of investigations, aimed at improving civil aviation safety.
| Events | Recommendation No | Recommandations | Completion Date | Current Evaluation | Digital document |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Serious incident that occurred on 29th July 2025 during the approach to Algiers/Houari Boumediene Airport. Airprox in flight between the Boeing B738 registered 7T-VCE operated by Tassili Airlines and the Airbus A320neo registered TS-INM operated by Nouvelair. | [Recommandation ALG-2026-005] | Considering that the fatigue management of air traffic controllers constitutes an important factor in maintaining an acceptable level of safety and preserving human performance in the exercise of air traffic control duties, the Technical Investigation Commission recommends that the National Air Navigation Establishment ensure compliance with the provisions of Technical Instruction No. 06-25 dated 26 January 2025 relating to air traffic services. | / | Not yet assessed | Download |
| [Recommandation ALG-2026-006] | Considering that the readback of air traffic control clearances and instructions constitutes a safety barrier for maintaining aviation safety, and that the ineffective application of the provisions of Technical Instruction No. 07-25 dated 26 January 2025 relating to air traffic management by the approach radar control unit on duty contributed to the loss of separation between the two aircraft, the Technical Investigation Commission recommends that the National Air Navigation Establishment ensure that air traffic controllers apply the provisions of paragraph 4.5.7.5.1.2 of the above-mentioned Technical Instruction No. 07-25 through the organization of seminars and workshops covering decision-making in the resolution of conflict situations, stress and time management, and situational awareness skills for the benefit of air traffic controllers. | / | Not yet assessed | ||
| Serious incident that occurred on 05 July 2025 North/East sector of the Algiers FIR Near mid-air collision between the Boeing 737 registered 7T-VKF operated by Air Algérie and the Boeing 777 registered A7-BFI operated by Qatar Airways. | [Recommandation ALG-2026-001] | In order to ensure that air traffic controllers are able to manage traffic safely and efficiently, while anticipating overload situations and adapting organization and procedures to prevent accidents and serious incidents, the Technical Investigation Commission recommends the following: The Établissement National de la Navigation Aérienne is required to review the current maximum workload of all sectors within the Algiers FIR, particularly that of the North-East sector, and to adjust operational thresholds in order to ensure the safe management of air traffic. | / | Not yet assessed | Download |
| [Recommandation ALG-2026-002] | During the simultaneous handling of several aircraft movements by the air traffic controller on duty, certain coordination steps were omitted. Consequently, the Technical Investigation Commission recommends the following: The Établissement National de la Navigation Aérienne is required to implement standardized procedures and automatic alerts in cases of erroneous air traffic control instructions and/or risks of omission, as well as internal procedures for the benefit of air traffic controllers regarding anticipation and prevention of air traffic conflicts. | / | Not yet assessed | ||
| [Recommandation ALG-2026-003] | With the aim of fully drawing lessons from this serious incident, correcting practices, strengthening operational safety, and preparing controllers to manage similar situations more effectively in the future, the Technical Investigation Commission recommends the following: The Établissement National de la Navigation Aérienne is required to take this case into consideration as part of its feedback and experience-sharing process through training seminars for all its air traffic controllers, particularly regarding the systematic reassessment of the situation before issuing any instruction, as well as lessons related to situational awareness, coordination, and priority management. | / | Not yet assessed | ||
| [Recommandation ALG-2026-004] | With the objective of ensuring that controllers maintain and further develop the knowledge, skills, and responsiveness required to effectively manage air traffic, including during complex or unusual situations, the Technical Investigation Commission recommends the following: The Établissement National de la Navigation Aérienne is required to implement a regular competency maintenance program, with particular emphasis on the simultaneous management of multiple air traffic movements, including simulations of complex situations, in order to ensure the responsiveness and effectiveness of air traffic controllers when faced with unusual scenarios. | / | Not yet assessed | ||
| ACCIDENT THE HELICOPTER BELL 206 L-3, REGISTRED 7T-WUF OCCURRED AT DOUERA ON 10TH AUGUST 2017 | [Recommandation -01-2021] | Helicopter operators conducting aerial photography missions shall ensure that their pilots comply with the operating altitudes authorized by the civil aviation authority. | / | Unable to assess | Download |
| [Recommandation -02-2021] | Operators carrying out specific aerial photography activities shall systematically establish a period of supervised flights under real operational conditions following the issuance of a Declaration of Competency Level (DNC). | / | |||
| [Recommandation -03-2021] | Helicopter operators conducting missions related to specific activities, particularly aerial photography, shall ensure beforehand that the scheduled pilots hold documentary evidence attesting to the completion of recurrent regulatory training courses, kept up to date. | / | |||
| [Recommandation -04-2021] | Helicopter operators conducting aerial photography missions shall establish, within the framework of their Safety Management System (SMS), a decision-making guide (wind limits, fuel carriage, etc.) | / | |||
| [Recommandation -05-2021] | Helicopter operators conducting missions related to specific activities, particularly aerial photography, shall ensure beforehand that the scheduled pilots meet the required prerequisites in terms of training, flight hours and supervised flights. | / | |||
| SERIOUS INCIDENT OF THE AIRCRAFT TYPE B737-800BCF, REGISTRED 7T-VJJ OCCURRED AT ALGIERS AIRPORT ON 21ST NOVEMBER 2023 | / | Updating the operations manuals and ground operations manuals in accordance with the applicable regulations. | 11 juin 2025 | Fully satisfactory attention | Download |
| / | Training of flight crew (PNT) and ground personnel to properly ensure Cargo transport activity | 06 Novembre 2025 | |||
| / | Ensure coordination between the different departments responsible for the elaboration and approval of work procedures at Air Algérie. | 11 juin 2025 | |||
| SERIOUS INCIDENT OF THE AIRCRAFT TYPE ATR72-500, REGISTRED 7T-VUJ AT ORAN AIRPORT OCCURRED ON 19TH MAY 2017 | / | Air operators raise crew awareness to maintain external visual vigilance and to pay full attention during the landing phase in the case of parallel runways. | / | Unable to assess | Download |
| / | Air operators are reminded of the measures to ensure that flight logbooks are completed by their crew after each flight. | / | |||
| / | The air navigation service provider will promptly review the air traffic flow scheme of this aerodrome. | / | |||
| / | The marking of a runway closed for maintenance must comply with the applicable regulations. | / | |||
| / | Runway 7L/25R – rubber removal to be carried out without delay. | / |
The responses are classified into six categories:
Fully satisfactory action: This category is assigned when the action taken significantly reduces or eliminates the deficiency. It is possible that a measure different from the one recommended has been adopted to address the deficiency, provided it is deemed acceptable.
Satisfactory intent: This category is assigned when the planned action, once fully implemented, is expected to significantly reduce or eliminate the deficiency, and substantial progress has been made since the recommendation was issued. However, the measures completed to date remain insufficient to mitigate aviation safety risks.
Partially satisfactory action: This category is assigned when the measures taken or planned will help mitigate the deficiency, but will not significantly reduce or eliminate it, and significant progress has been made since the recommendation was issued.
Unsatisfactory action: This category is assigned when no action has been taken and none has been proposed to reduce or eliminate the deficiency. This category may also be assigned when a recommendation has been issued and in circulation for more than five years without any specific action plan or timeline to complete the required safety measures.
Unable to assess: This category is assigned when no response has been provided to the recommendation, or when the response received does not contain sufficient details to allow the Bureau to clearly determine whether the safety deficiency will be mitigated or eliminated.
Not yet assessed: This category is assigned when the recommendation was recently issued and no official response has yet been received, or when it has not yet been formally reviewed by management.
